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Corporate Social Responsibility: The Myopic Barometer? 
Christo Ferreira, David K. Ding and Udomsak Wongchoti

 
Managers have a fiduciary duty to strategically align firm activities and partake in opportunities 
that maximizes shareholder wealth. Managers, then, should ensure that their strategies maximize 
the sum of the expected discounted future profits. As a result the firm discount rate is critical and 
informs the decisions made by management to strike the appropriate balance between current 
and future benefits. Unfortunately, an information asymmetry exists between management and 
shareholders around the true economic position of the firm (Myers & Majluf, 1984), as a result 
shareholders have a disadvantage when pricing the capital they provide and might require higher 
returns than might be warranted (Thakor, 1990). This effect could bias the discount rate upward, 
in turn managers would focus on short-term goals overemphasizing strategies with immediate 
payoffs (Bebchuk & Stole, 1993) at the expense of strategies with superior but more distant 
payoffs—that is, they would engage in myopic management (Mizik, 2010).  
The incentives and pressures faced by managers may lead to an overemphasis on short-
term goals. Earnings projections and failing to meet analysts’ expectations could prove punitive. 
Secondly, managers’ personal motivation and compensation structure often incentivize stock 
price gains (Grant, King, & Polak, 1996). This creates an incentive to manipulate the signals they 
send to the stock market in an attempt to inflate the stock price.  
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Managers, can manipulate performance signals (Stein, 1989) through accounting based 
earnings management (discretionary accruals manipulation) (Healy & Wahlen, 1999). While 
such practices have negative consequences for a firm when uncovered (DuCharme, Malatesta, & 
Sefcik, 2004), they do not affect the foundations of firm business performance and do not alter 
either the amount or the temporal flow of true economic profits.  
Conversely, myopic management, such as: ignoring stakeholder and corporate social 
responsibility interests (CSR), foregoing capital expenditure projects (Capex), underinvesting in 
research and development (R&D), and cutting advertising (Mktg.) will affect the firm’s 
economic position. The change in economic position will alter the flow of expected true 
economic profits. Myopic management involves altering operational practices that directly affect 
the business process. When initiated at the top organizational level, myopic management poses 
particular challenges. This short-term focus could lead to underinvesting in the long run (for 
exceptions see Bebchuk and Stole (1993)) especially in research and development (Chan, Martin, 
& Kensinger, 1990), advertising (Mizik, 2010), and capital expenditure (Burton, Lonie, & 
Power, 1999;Chung, Wright, & Charoenwong, 1998;McConnell & Muscarella, 1985). In turn 
myopia could affect economic profits. As a result myopic management poses a risk to the firm as 
this anemia could undermine the firm’s position in the market place.   
Myopic management is not exclusively limited to performance incentives but could also 
stem from takeover threats (Stein, 1989), momentum trading (Bushee, 1998), and institutional 
ownership (Bushee, 1998;Wahal & McConnell, 2000). 
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We believe that the factors driving management myopia in capital expenditure, R&D and 
marketing, could also affect management’s decisions relating to CSR (S. Brammer, Brooks, & 
Pavelin, 2006;S. J. Brammer & Pavelin, 2006;Harris & Raviv, 1996). Incentive and market 
pressures on management to massage earnings can induce management to reduce investment in 
these discretionary activities. Evidence suggests marketing intensity is especially sensitive to 
myopic investment (Deleersnyder, Dekimpe, Steenkamp, & Leeflang, 2009;Graham, Harvey, & 
Rajgopal, 2005;Lamey, Deleersnyder, Dekimpe, & Steenkamp, 2007). Considering the close 
links between CSR and advertising (Servaes & Tamayo, 2013) it seems plausible that myopic 
managers would reduce CSR investment accordingly. Under investment in CSR could lead to 
increases in the cost of equity (El Ghoul, Guedhami, Kwok, & Mishra, 2011), a reduction in firm 
value (Jiao, 2010), or a loss of performance (Flammer, 2012). 
More importantly, CSR is considered a proxy for good management, due to the strategic 
and long-term nature associated with CSR. CSR should, as a proxy for good or non-myopic 
managers, be associated with a significant reduction in myopia across advertising, R&D, and 
capital expenditure. The key objective of the current study is to assess the market’s ability to 
properly value CSR in the face of myopic management and to quantify financial consequences of 
myopia. Specifically, this study examines the consequences of cutting support for socially 
responsible activities or increasing irresponsible activities when a firm experiences enhanced 
financial performance. The current study is a large sample attempt to assess consequences of 
firm level myopic management and the importance of CSR. The context free firm level setting 
allows for broad generalizations about the financial market’s ability to properly value firm 
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strategies and about the consequences of myopia. Our results indicate that myopia does impact 
firms’ risk adjusted performance; however the market might struggle to immediately recognize 
management myopia. We also show that CSR, specifically concern, is a good indicator of other 
forms of myopia and that the market has a better ability to recognize CSR myopia.  
 
I. Additional Literature 
Stock price based compensation and incentives for management will result in efficient 
managerial decisions in the absence of information asymmetry. However, in the presence of 
information asymmetries the economic outcomes differ significantly from the outcomes of the 
perfect information models. Under information asymmetry, compensation linked to stock market 
performance can incentivize managers to manipulate stock prices rather than maximize 
shareholder wealth.  
Troublingly, managers can take actions the principal cannot observe. Narayanan (1985) 
and Stein (1989) show that managers have the ability to manipulate the earnings flow at the 
expense of long-term prosperity. The principal might observe the distorted earnings but cannot 
allot the reported numbers into the ‘true’ and ‘distortion’ components. This reduces the 
principal’s ability to use current reported earnings as predictors of future financial performance 
as these could come at the expense of future performance. Managerial incentives to engage in 
myopia and manipulate current earnings increase with the importance managers attach to their 
current period earnings and current stock price.  
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If managers hold private information, myopic management could occur even if the 
principal is able to perfectly observe the manager’s actions. The stock market may try to infer the 
private information managers have from firm actions; some managers might manipulate their 
actions to create a favorable market reaction through signaling. Introduced by (Spence, 1973), 
signaling models provide a framework that demonstrates how private information can lead to 
myopia. The market has difficulty determining the true economic prospects of firms. However, 
the market can infer economic prospects from the firm’s investment level (Bebchuk & Stole, 
1993;Bizjak, Brickley, & Coles, 1993;Trueman, 1986) or by a specific project type (Hirshleifer, 
Chordia, & Lim, 2001). Investment decisions act as a signal to the market about the firm’s 
economic state. However, firms with poor prospects have an incentive to mimic the behavior of 
good type firms to extract short-term stock market gains. Depending on circumstance, myopic 
incentives can lead to over/underinvestment or result in a suboptimal choice of a particular 
project type. Milgrom and Roberts (1992, p. 471) comment that, in general, managers “put too 
much emphasis on activities that boost short-term performance compared to those whose benefits 
will be hidden.”  
The signaling behavior of myopic firms will distort the market equilibrium forcing good 
firms to invest at an even greater level (lower in the case of better efficiency) to separate 
themselves from the bad firms. At the extreme, good firms will be unable to credibly signal 
economic prospects. (Akerlof, 1970)’s lemon’s market mechanism (1970) shows under these 
circumstances good firms will completely forgo an appropriate opportunity, if it requires in need 
of equity finance (Myers & Majluf, 1984). 
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Regardless of firms economic position managers have better information or a better 
ability to evaluate available strategic options than outsiders, allowing myopia to occur even in 
firms with ‘good’ prospects. The market uses available public information and forms a general 
opinion about the best course of actions for a firm as managers cannot credibly reveal their better 
private information about the firm prospects. Managers incentivized by stock price, may choose 
projects the stock market believes are in the best interest of the firm (Brandenburger & Polak, 
1996) rather than acting on their better private information and making optimal investments for 
the firm.   
(Bizjak et al., 1993) maintain that managers with a greater incentive to maximize current 
stock price relative to future profits and future stock price are more likely to engage in signal 
jamming. They also argue that myopia will increase as the probability of the manager departing 
or retiring from the firms increases.  
 
II. Hypothesis 
We believe that the factors which inform managements’ decisions regarding marketing, 
R&D, and capital expenditure also inform CSR decisions. Furthermore, we believe that many 
CSR related activities are interconnected, or part of, the aforementioned activities. As a result we 
believe that CSR will be positively correlated with advertising, R&D, and capital expenditure. 
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𝐻1: The level of CSR within a firm is positively correlated with advertising, R&D 
and capital expenditure. 
As discussed, incentives for myopic behavior increase with the market’s inability to 
recognize and evaluate the long-term consequences of managerial actions. Managers’ choice of 
tools and strategy to obfuscate myopia is also driven by the market’s ability to recognize the 
impact of these tools and strategies on firms’ long-term performance. These informational 
concerns are particularly pertinent when considering mangers choice to engage in CSR. The 
evidence within our literature suggests that CSR is inherently mispriced by the market 
((Renneboog, Ter Horst, & Zhang, 2008a), (Kempf & Osthoff, 2007), and (Statman & Glushkov, 
2009)). Fortunately, timely accurate CSR disclosure or increased visibility in part reduces these 
asymmetries ((Dhaliwal, Radhakrishnan, Tsang, & Yang, 2012) and (Ramchander, Schwebach, 
& Staking, 2012)). Notwithstanding these issues, market participants face heterogeneous search 
costs and processing ability relating to CSR. These differences are compounded by the 
heterogeneous utility functions among investors (stakeholders) ((Bollen, 2007)). As a result, the 
asymmetric information or information opacity around CSR ((Cho, Lee, & Pfeiffer Jr., 2013)), 
coupled with the market’s heterogeneous capacity and desire to price the complexities of CSR, 
could undermine the assumption that all aspects of CSR are uniformly, timely, and linearly 
priced. 
This presents a particular concern when considering myopic behavior by management, as 
the markets inability to price CSR allows managers to underinvest in CSR for short-term gains 
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with potential long-term consequences. Even if CSR information were perfectly symmetric and 
freely accessible by market participants, the participants’ reaction or non-reaction to the 
information would be heterogeneous depending on their utility function and the relative score of 
the firm’s CSR. We posit that the asymmetry present in the market’s ability to search, process, 
and value CSR would distort the relationship between CSR and stock price reaction even further.  
Do market participants recognize that firms cutting discretionary activities at the same 
time as they are reporting increased earnings might be engaging in myopic management and that 
these increased earnings might not be indicative of improved future prospects but might instead 
be coming at the expense of future performance? If market participants can determine the quality 
of reported earnings, they should value those earnings systematically lower for those firms with 
discretionary cuts. If CSR is a proxy for good management, as well as being interconnected with 
other discretionary investments then CSR should be a good indicator of myopic management. 
We expect if investors use CSR information to form expectations about a firm’s future 
performance and current state of management, then they are expected to appreciate the 
possibility that firms cutting CSR investment at the same time as they are reporting increased 
earnings might be engaging in myopic management and that these increased earnings might not 
be indicative of improved future prospects but might instead be coming at the expense of future 
performance. If market participants indeed appreciate this possibility and realize that the 
“quality” of reported earnings might be lower for firms cutting CSR, they will value such 
earnings systematically lower than those of other firms with increased profitability. 
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𝐻2: Same-year stock returns for firms with myopic CSR will be lower than 
returns for other firms with increased profitability 
 
Investors might not appreciate the long-term consequences of CSR cuts or cannot 
recognize management myopia as it occurs but do so only in the future, when the consequences 
of spending cuts have affected future profits. If investors struggle to recognize CSR myopia 
initially and only adjust and incorporate the information in subsequent years; does the potential 
future negative adjustment outweigh the benefits of higher valuation in the initial period? To the 
extent that the stock market participants do not fully and immediately appreciate the trade-off 
between CSR and the reported earnings, or do not fully appreciate the long-term consequences of 
CSR, there will be a systematic future-term negative adjustment in the valuation of myopic 
firms. 
𝐻3: Future stock returns will be lower for firms with myopic CSR at the time they 
reported increased earnings than the future stock returns for other firms. 
 
It should follow that a management team ethically inclined to reduce the firm’s negative 
impact on society, would potentially face a moral conflict with regard to any earnings 
manipulation. We believe that the factors driving management myopia in capital expenditure, 
R&D and marketing, could also affect management’s decisions relating to CSR. Incentives and 
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market pressures on management to massage earnings can induce management to reduce 
investment in these discretionary activities. Considering the sensitivity of discretionary 
expenditures to myopic investment and the close links between CSR and other discretionary 
activities it seems plausible that myopic managers would reduce CSR investment in accordance 
with other discretionary activities. If CSR is a proxy for good management, as well as being 
interconnected with other discretionary investments then CSR should be a good indicator of 
myopic management. Alternatively, if CSR is not given the same level of consideration as other 
discretionary expenditures but, rather is a downstream consequence of upstream discretionary 
expenditure, then CSR might act as the “canary in the coal mine” indicating a reduction in 
dictionary expenditure as firms’ CSR profiles degrade. CSR should, in either case, be associated 
with a significant reduction in myopia across marketing, R&D, and capital expenditure. We 
believe that CSR could act as a myopic barometer potentially signaling myopic behavior.  
 
𝐻4: An increase in CSR will be associated with a reduction in managerial myopia. 
 
III. Data & Methodology 
 
This study will be principally based on the Environmental Social and Governance (ESG) 
ratings developed by Kinder, Lydenberg, and Domini. KLD is a proprietary database, which 
rates securities on the Russell 3000 according to various measures, since 1991. The ratings fall 
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within seven categories relating to community, corporate governance, diversity, employee 
relations, environment, human rights, and product. The KLD data also rates securities in the 
Alcohol, Gambling, Firearms, Military, Nuclear Power, and Tobacco industries according to 
exclusionary screening criteria. Each category has several subcategories representing possible 
Strength or responsible behavior (positive points) and Concerns or negative behavior (negative 
points). KLD analysts rate firms on their various CSR characteristics annually by assigning a 
binary point to several subcategories within each aforementioned category. It is important to note 
that Strength and Concern within each category are not perfect opposites, nor are there equal 
amounts of possible Strength and Concern within each category or across categories. We exclude 
stocks (unless stated) that have been marked as controversial as well as stocks that were 
examined by KLD but failed to receive a score, in line with literature.  
KLD has been extensively covered in the literature, being the basis of many studies 
relating to CSR.
1
  The most popular aggregation method among these studies takes the sum of 
Strength net of Concerns for each category as per equation (1) and aggregates this into an overall 
score as per equation (2). 
𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑡
𝑗 =  ∑ 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ𝑠
𝑗 − ∑ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑟
𝑗  
𝑘𝑡
𝑗
𝑟=1  
𝑢𝑡
𝑗
𝑠=1      (1) 
 
𝐸𝑆𝐺𝑡 = ∑  𝐸𝑆𝐺𝑡
𝑗7
𝑗=1      (2) 
                                                 
1
 See Becchetti & Ciciretti, 2006; Chatterji et al., 2009; Galema et al., 2008; Gillan et al., 2010; Hillman & Keim, 
2001; Statman & Glushkov, 2009 for the use of the KLD dataset. 
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Where 𝐸𝑆𝐺𝑡
𝑗
 is the aggregated ESG score for category j, year t. Similarly 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑠
𝑗
 is 
equal to one if the firm meets Strength s in category j, otherwise 0; 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑟
𝑗
 is equal to one if 
the firm meets Concern r in category j, otherwise 0. 
As KLD data is binary with a heterogeneous amount of concern and strength criteria 
allocated across various subcategories, it could be misleading to look at a firm’s ultimate score. 
Firstly, the result of the ‘netting off’ process would obscure information, as Concern and 
Strength are not perfect opposites.  Netting off erroneously assumes all binary points are equal 
and opposite. Secondly, as the number of possible points vary not only across Concern and 
Strength categories but also over subcategories as well, it becomes difficult to interpret the 
meaning of a whole number. In this study, each firm is assigned a percentage of possible points 
for both Concern and Strength, referred to as their level of CSR. This allows one to compare a 
firm’s performance across subcategories, between Strength and Concern and across years.2  
Formally, the aggregation takes the following form in equation (3), with the overall score in 
equation (4). 
𝐸𝑆𝐺𝑡
𝑗 =  
∑ 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑠
𝑗
 
𝑢𝑡
𝑗
𝑠=1
𝑢𝑡
𝑗 −
∑ 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑟
𝑗
 
𝑘𝑡
𝑗
𝑟=1
𝑘𝑡
𝑗     (3) 
𝐸𝑆𝐺𝑡 = ∑  
𝐸𝑆𝐺𝑡
𝑗
7
7
𝑗=1      (4) 
                                                 
2
 Example: If a firm, a scored one out of the possible four for the Strength section of the Environmental category it 
would be modified to 0.25. As there were four possible points available, but only 1 point was awarded. Following, if 
the firm also scored two Concern points (in the Environmental category) from a possible 10, a percentage score of 
0.2 would be awarded. Under the binary system the firm would have a net score of minus one (one Strength less two 
Concern), while as a percentage the firm would have a Net-CSR score of 0.05 (0.25 Strength less 0.2 Concern). 
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The KLD data is matched with data from the Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) for 
the period beginning 1991 through 2009. We average volume (volume), adjusted price (price), 
and adjusted shares outstanding (shares outstanding) for each calendar yearend t. Furthermore, 
income statement and balance sheet items are obtained by matching the CRSP data with 
Compustat through CRSPlink. Size is calculated as the natural logarithm of total assets, leverage 
is calculated as the total liabilities over total assets, turnover is calculated as the natural logarithm 
of average monthly volume over shares outstanding at the end of each year t. Return on assets 
and return on equity are calculated as earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) to total assets, and 
EBIT to book equity, respectively. Tobin’s Q is calculated as market value of assets over book 
value of assets, where market value is equal to total assets plus market equity less book equity. 
The interest rate is interest expense to total liabilities. Marketing intensity is selling general and 
administrative expenses less research and development R&D expenses over total assets. R&D 
intensity is R&D expenditure over total assets, capital expenditure intensity (capex) is capex over 
total assets. Finally sales growth is calculated as the change in sales at time t with respect to t-1.
3
 
To estimate the risk adjusted stock returns we employ The Fama and French (1993, 1996) three-
factor plus momentum (Carhart, 1997) model to compute compounded abnormal yearly returns 
from weekly returns. Specifically compounded abnormal stock return (CAR) is: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑙𝑜𝑔 ∑ = [1 + (𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑤 − 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑤)
52
𝑤=1        (1) 
where 
 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑤 = ?̂?𝑖𝑡(𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡,𝑤 − 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒,𝑤) + ?̂?𝑖𝑡(𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑤) + ℎ̂𝑖𝑡(𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑤) + ?̂?𝑖𝑡(𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑚) (2) 
                                                 
3 Coded missing values to zero to ensure robust sample size, results are not affected. 
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and ?̂?, ?̂?, ℎ̂, and ?̂? come from estimating The Fama and French (1992, 1993) three factor model 
augmented with momentum (Carhart, 1997) factor
4
, for each firm i, in year t: 
(𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑤 − 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒,𝑤) = 𝛼 +  𝛽𝑖𝑡(𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡,𝑤 − 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒,𝑤) + 𝑠𝑖𝑡(𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑤) + ℎ𝑖𝑡(𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑤) + 𝑚𝑖𝑡(𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑚) +  𝜀𝑖,𝑤 
 
 
Descriptive statistics 
Table I presents the number of firms assessed by KLD for each year matched with CRSPlink. 
Table II shows the descriptive statistics of the CSR subcategories, while Table III shows the 
financial characteristics of the firms. 
Figure  illustrates firm distribution along the Net-CSR continuum. Figure  shows the 
distribution of Strength, while Figure  shows the distribution of Concern, and Table IV shows 
the average yearly score of Strength, Concern and Net-CSR.  
Methodology 
To identify myopia we focuses on the group of firms that simultaneously report greater-than-
normal operating profits (return on assets) and lower-than-normal marketing intensity (Mktg), 
R&D intensity, capital intensity (Capex), and CSR that is, firms with (𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝑂?̂?𝑖𝑡|𝑖𝑡−1) > 0, 
(𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑔𝑖𝑡 − 𝑀𝑘𝑡?̂?𝑖𝑡|𝑖𝑡−1) < 0, (𝑅&𝐷𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅&?̂?𝑖𝑡|𝑖𝑡−1) < 0, (𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 − 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑥̂ 𝑖𝑡|𝑖𝑡−1) < 0 , 
and (𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝐶𝑆?̂?𝑖𝑡|𝑖𝑡−1) < 0, where  𝑅𝑂?̂?𝑖𝑡|𝑖𝑡−1,  𝑀𝑘𝑡?̂?𝑖𝑡|𝑖𝑡−1, 𝑅&?̂?𝑖𝑡|𝑖𝑡−1 ,𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑥̂ 𝑖𝑡|𝑖𝑡−1 , 
𝐶𝑆?̂?𝑖𝑡|𝑖𝑡−1 reflect the normal or expected level of profitability, marketing intensity, R&D 
intensity, capital expenditure, and CSR for firm i in period t, respectively. These are the firms 
                                                 
4Retrieved from Kenneth French’s online data library available at http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html.  
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that might be decreasing their marketing, R&D, Capex, and CSR spending with the intention to 
inflate reported earnings. To identify potentially myopic firms, it is first necessary to determine 
the “normal” or expected level of the above mention factors for each firm for each period. The 
following models represent the intuition behind estimating normal levels of firm earnings, 
marketing intensity, R&D intensity, Capex intensity, and CSR 
 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑟𝑜𝑎,𝑖 + 𝜙𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝑟𝑜𝑎𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜓𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖,𝑡  (1a) 
𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑔𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑚𝑘𝑡𝑔,𝑖 +  𝜙𝑚𝑘𝑡𝑔𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑔𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝑚𝑘𝑡𝑔𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜓𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖,𝑡 (1b) 
𝑅&𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑟&𝑑,𝑖 + 𝜙𝑟&𝑑𝑅&𝐷𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝑟&𝑑𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜓𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖,𝑡  (1c) 
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑥,𝑖 + 𝜙𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑥𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑥𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜓𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖,𝑡 (1d) 
𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑐𝑠𝑟,𝑖 +  𝜙𝑐𝑠𝑟𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝑐𝑠𝑟𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜓𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖,𝑡   (1e) 
 
where 𝑣𝑖,𝑡 =  𝜀𝑖,𝑡 +  𝑢𝑖,𝑡 and i =1,….N, t =1,….T. Furthermore, i represents the cross-sectional 
units, t represents the time periods. 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡,  𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑔𝑖𝑡, 𝑅&𝐷𝑖𝑡, 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡, and  𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑡 are profitability, 
marketing intensity, R&D intensity, capital expenditure intensity, and CSR (either Strength or 
Concern) respectively, for firm i in period t, and  𝛼𝑟𝑜𝑎,𝑖, 𝛼𝑚𝑘𝑡𝑔,𝑖, 𝛼𝑟&𝑑,𝑖, 𝛼𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑥,𝑖 , and 𝛼𝑐𝑠𝑟,𝑖 are 
the firm-specific intercepts; 𝜙 are the estimates of persistence for each dependent variable using 
their lagged values 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡−1,  𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑔𝑖𝑡−1, 𝑅&𝐷𝑖𝑡−1 ,𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡−1 , 𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑡−1. 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 are a series 
of control variables including Size (logarithm of total assets), Leverage (total liabilities to total 
assets), Sales-growth (sales in time t with respect to sales in t-1 over sales in t-1), Mktg.(selling, 
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general, and administrative expenses less R&D expenses to total assets), R&D (R&D expenses to 
total assets), Capex (capital expenditure to total assets), Strength, and Concern (as defined 
earlier).Naturally, for each set of equations, the dependent variable will not be included in the list 
of the control variables. 𝜓𝑡 is the time specific effect; 𝛿𝑖 accounts for the industry specific effect. 
Assuming ﬁxed effects, the cross-sectional error term,𝑣𝑖,𝑡, contains the following two effects: (1) 
the unobserved time-invariant, ﬁrm-speciﬁc effect, 𝜀𝑖,𝑡, and (2) a stochastic error term, 𝑢𝑖,𝑡, 
varying across time and cross-section. The time-speciﬁc effect is included to capture aggregate 
shocks, which may appear in any year, similarly the industry effect captures industry specific 
heterogeneity. The ﬁrm-speciﬁc effect,𝜀𝑖,𝑡, is included to capture ﬁrm-speciﬁc differences, such 
as managerial ability, geographical location, and other unobserved factors. The unobserved ﬁrm-
speciﬁc effect,𝜀𝑖,𝑡, is correlated with the explanatory variables but not with the changes in the 
explanatory variables.  We assume the vector of control variables to be endogenous with regard 
to the dependent variable, with only the time and industry effects treated as exogenous. 
In order to obtain consistent and efﬁcient parameter estimates of our model speciﬁed in 
equation (1), we use the system general method of moments (GMM) approaches originally 
proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998, 2000). The GMM method 
allows for a number of advantages: it exploits the time series element of the data; it controls for 
ﬁrm-speciﬁc effects, like the ﬁxed effect method; it also allows for the inclusion of lagged 
dependent variables as repressors; and controls for the endogeneity of all explanatory variables. 
The GMM is designed for panel data, which is a cross-section of data over time. As a result of 
including the time-series dimension of the data, degrees of freedom increase.  
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The GMM can be used when: (1) N is large but T is small; (2) the explanatory variables 
are endogenous; and (3) unobserved ﬁrm-speciﬁc effects are correlated with other repressors. 
Other estimators do not seem to be as effective. The within-groups estimator results in biased 
upward parameter estimates in a panel of short length. This occurs since the new lagged 
dependent variable, after the subtraction of the variable means and the new independent variables 
after the subtraction of the variable means, is correlated with the new error term. In this case, the 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimator continues to be biased, even when ﬁrm-speciﬁc effects 
are eliminated through ﬁrst differencing. If the number of years in the panel data is small, the 
problem with this estimator is even more distinct. 
Arellano and Bond (1991) show that the following moment conditions hold for the 
equations in ﬁrst differences, under the assumption that 𝑢𝑖,𝑡, is not serially correlated and 
explanatory variables are endogenous: 
𝐸(∆𝑢𝑖,𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡−𝑟) = 0;  𝐸(∆𝑢𝑖,𝑡𝑥𝑖,𝑡−𝑟) = 0; where r = 2,…,t-1 and t = 3,…,T 
These conditions make it possible to use, as instrumental variables for the equations in ﬁrst-
differences, lagged values of endogenous variables dated t-2. The ﬁrst differenced GMM 
estimator is a more efﬁcient estimator than the Anderson and Hsiao (1981) estimator, according 
to Arellano and Bond (1991). There is another issue with the ﬁrst-differenced GMM. If lagged 
dependent variables and explanatory variables are persistent over time, the lagged levels of these 
variables, the internal instruments, are weak. This causes a large ﬁnite sample bias and weak 
accuracy.  
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In response to the weaknesses of the ﬁrst-differenced GMM, Arellano and Bover (1995) 
propose the System GMM. This method reduces the biases found in ﬁrst-differenced GMM and 
improves its precision, as noted by Blundell and Bond (1998). The reason for these 
improvements lies in the incorporation of the regression in levels. Variables in levels imply a 
stronger correlation with the instruments, but a drawback is that ﬁrm-speciﬁc effects cannot be 
controlled for. Additional speciﬁc instruments must be added to remedy this potential bias. The 
system GMM uses lagged differences of the independent variable as instruments. The correlation 
between the error term and levels of explanatory variables is constant over time. This implies 
that the instruments are valid.  
𝐸[𝑋𝑖,𝑡+𝑝 ∗ 𝑢𝑖] = 𝐸[𝑋𝑖,𝑡+𝑞 ∗ 𝑢𝑖],  for all p and q 
In order to maintain the validity of these instruments, the initial condition, 𝑋𝑖,1 must comply with 
the stationarity restriction 𝐸(∆𝑋𝑖,2𝜀𝑖) = 0, according to Arellano and Bover (1995). At this point, 
∆𝑋𝑖,𝑡 will correlate with 𝜀𝑖 if and only if ∆𝑋𝑖,2 is correlated with 𝜀𝑖. Although there is a 
correlation between the level of right-hand-side variables, 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 and the ﬁrm-speciﬁc effect, 𝜀𝑖, 
there is no correlation between the differences of right-hand¬side variables, ∆𝑋𝑖,𝑡, and the ﬁrm-
speciﬁc effect, 𝜀𝑖. A level equation estimator is developed from this new assumption, which 
exploits more moment conditions. Lagged differences of independent variables, ∆𝑋𝑖,𝑡−𝑟 are used 
as additional instruments for the equations in levels when 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 is mean stationary.  
Blundell and Bond (1998) show that the moment conditions deﬁned for the ﬁrst-differenced 
equation can be combined with the moment conditions deﬁned for the level equation to estimate 
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a system GMM. When an independent variable is acknowledged as endogenous, the moment 
conditions for the system GMM are as follows:  
𝐸(∆𝑢𝑖,𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡−𝑟) = 0;  𝐸(∆𝑢𝑖,𝑡𝑥𝑖,𝑡−𝑟) = 0; where r = 2,…,t-1 and t = 3,…,T 
𝐸(𝑣𝑖,𝑡∆𝑦𝑖,𝑡−𝑟) = 0; 𝐸(𝑣𝑖,𝑡∆𝑥𝑖,𝑡−𝑟) = 0; where r = 1,…,t-1 and t = 3,…,T 
The system GMM uses lagged levels of the independent and dependent variables as well as 
lagged differences of dependent and independent variables as instruments. It does this by 
connecting the T-2 equations from the ﬁrst-differenced GMM and the T-2 equations in levels into 
one system. According to Yasar et al. (2004), these instruments hold so long as the initial 
conditions,𝑌𝑖,1, satisfy the stationary restriction 𝐸(∆𝑌𝑖,2𝜀𝑖) = 0. When both ∆𝑋𝑖,𝑡and ∆𝑌𝑖,𝑡 are 
uncorrelated with 𝜀𝑖 both lagged differences of explanatory variables, ∆𝑋𝑖,𝑡−𝑟 and lagged 
differences of dependent variable, ∆𝑌𝑖,𝑡−𝑟, are valid instruments for the equations in levels.  
In our quest to identify myopia we naturally assume that there is persistence in our dependent 
variable, in order to determine ‘normal’ levels.  Our estimates of the AR (1) coefﬁcients on our 
dependent variables show high levels of  persistence, thus, the lagged levels of variables would 
provide weak instruments for the differences in the ﬁrst-differenced GMM model. As a result, 
the system estimator is a more apt method than the ﬁrst-differenced GMM. Therefore, this paper 
combines the ﬁrst-differenced version of our model with the level version of the model for which 
the instruments used must be orthogonal to the ﬁrm-speciﬁc effects. To review, the system GMM 
estimator uses lagged levels of the dependent and independent variables as instruments for the 
ﬁrst-difference equation, while for the level version of the model, a lagged difference of these 
variables are used as instruments.  
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We estimate the parameters using system GMM with standard errors robust to patterns of 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation within panels; secondly we use the Hansen-J test of over 
identifying restrictions proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) to assess whether the instrumental 
variables are associated with the dependent variable beyond its ability to explain the independent 
variables. The null hypothesis of the Hansen-J tests states that the instruments are not correlated 
with the error terms, while the alternative states that the instruments are correlated with the error 
terms. This test uses a x
2
 distribution with (J-K) degrees of freedom, where J represents the 
number of instruments used and K represents the number of regressors used. Failure to reject the 
null hypothesis provides evidence that valid instruments are used.  
Secondly, this study tests whether serial correlation exists among the error terms, also 
proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). Failure to reject the null hypothesis of no second order 
serial correlation supports our model. Valid orthogonality conditions are used and the 
instruments are valid. One would expect the differenced error term to be ﬁrst order serially 
correlated, although the original error term is not. 
After using system GMM to estimate the estimates of persistence, 𝜙, for each dependent 
variable using their lagged values (𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡−1,  𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑔𝑖𝑡−1, 𝑅&𝐷𝑖𝑡−1, 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡−1 , and 𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑡−1). We 
estimate predicted dependent variables, 𝑅𝑂?̂?𝑖𝑡|𝑖𝑡−1, 𝑀𝑘𝑡?̂?𝑖𝑡|𝑖𝑡−1,  𝑅&?̂?𝑖𝑡|𝑖𝑡−1, 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑥̂ 𝑖𝑡|𝑖𝑡−1, and 
𝐶𝑆?̂?𝑖𝑡|𝑖𝑡−1. The forecast errors in these models provide the estimates of the deviation of the series 
from the norm in each period; that is, 𝜀𝑟𝑜𝑎,𝑖𝑡 = (𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝑂?̂?𝑖𝑡|𝑖𝑡−1), 𝜀𝑚𝑘𝑡𝑔,𝑖𝑡 = (𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑔𝑖𝑡 −
𝑀𝑘𝑡?̂?𝑖𝑡|𝑖𝑡−1), 𝜀𝑟&𝑑,𝑖𝑡 = (𝑅&𝐷𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅&?̂?𝑖𝑡|𝑖𝑡−1), 𝜀𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑥,𝑖𝑡 = (𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 − 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑥̂ 𝑖𝑡|𝑖𝑡−1), 
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and 𝜀𝑐𝑠𝑟,𝑖𝑡 = (𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝐶𝑆?̂?𝑖𝑡|𝑖𝑡−1). These values are used to classify firms into potentially 
myopic and no myopic groups. With Mktg_M.being a categorical variable taking the value of 1 if 
(𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑔𝑖𝑡 − 𝑀𝑘𝑡?̂?𝑖𝑡|𝑖𝑡−1) < 0, otherwise 0. R&D_M. being a categorical variable taking the value 
of 1 if (𝑅&𝐷𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅&?̂?𝑖𝑡|𝑖𝑡−1) < 0,otherwise 0.Capex_M. being a categorical variable taking the 
value of 1 if (𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 − 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑥̂ 𝑖𝑡|𝑖𝑡−1) < 0, otherwise 0. Str_M. being a categorical variable 
taking the value of 1 if  (𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 − 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ̂ 𝑖𝑡|𝑖𝑡−1) < 0, otherwise 0. Con_M. being a 
catagorial variable taking the value of 1 if where (𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑡 − 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑛̂ 𝑖𝑡|𝑖𝑡−1) > 0, otherwise 
0 . 
𝐻2 predicts that market participants appreciate the differences in earnings quality of 
potentially myopic and non-myopic firms and react less positively to earnings reported by 
myopic firms immediately. Alternatively  𝐻3 suggests that the financial markets do not 
distinguish or do not fully appreciate long-term financial consequences CSR activities and are 
not able to properly price myopic spending cuts until the consequences are realized. To assesses 
the magnitude of adjustment in the valuation of potentially myopic firms in future years. We 
determine the total value implications of myopia, including the financial market reaction in the 
initial period, when the myopic firms presumably realized the benefits of myopic management. 
We assess the difference in future multiyear cumulative risk-adjusted stock returns for firms with 
myopic CSR behavior versus benchmark firms when the initial period is taken into account. That 
is, the following can be estimated: 
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𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝑘|𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽1,𝑘𝑀𝑦𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2′𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜓𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖,𝑡,  (2) 
for k = 0, 1, 2, 3, and 4     
 
where 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝑘|𝑡 is the k-period ahead (i.e., future multi-period) risk-adjusted stock return or for 
firm i, with classification into myopic and non-myopic portfolios occurring at time t, and 
𝑀𝑦𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡 is defined as a categorical variable that takes the value of 1 if firm i in year t was 
categorized as potentially myopic and 0 if otherwise. If the market captures the impact of myopia 
in the year it occurs then 𝛽𝑖,0<0 and 0= 𝛽𝑖,1= 𝛽𝑖,2= 𝛽𝑖,3 =𝛽𝑖,4. If the market cannot immediately 
detect myopic behavior but reacts to the future negative consequences then a slow negative 
adjustment in the valuation of potentially myopic firms should be observed, and then 𝛽𝑖,0>0 and  
𝛽𝑖,1< 𝛽𝑖,2< 𝛽𝑖,3 < 𝛽𝑖,4<0. 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 is a vector of control variables including Size (logarithm of 
total assets), Leverage (total liabilities to total assets), Sales-growth (sales in time t with respect 
to sales in t-1 over sales in t-1), M/B (market value of equity to book value of equity), 
Advertising (advertising expense to sales), R&D (R&D expenses to total assets), Capex (capital 
expenditure to total assets), Strength, and Concern. 
𝐻4 considers whether CSR decreases the likelihood of firms engaging in myopic 
behavior, as such we specify a logistic model to capture the impact of CSR on the likelihood of a 
firm being myopic. Specifically: 
 
Pr(𝑀𝑦𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡 = 1) =  𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽1′𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2′𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜓𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖,𝑡  (3) 
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where 𝑀𝑦𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡 is defined as a categorical variable that takes the value of 1 if firm i in 
year t was categorized as potentially myopic and 0 if otherwise. ′𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is either Strength, and 
Concern as defined earlier. ′𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 is a vector of control variables including Size (logarithm 
of total assets), Leverage (total liabilities to total assets), Sales-growth (sales in time t with 
respect to sales in t-1 over sales in t-1), Mktg.(selling, general, and administrative expenses less 
R&D expenses to total assets), R&D (R&D expenses to total assets), Capex (capital expenditure 
to total assets).Naturally, for each set of equations, the dependent variable will not be included in 
the list of the control variables.  
Furthermore 𝐹(𝑧) = 𝑒𝑧/(1 + 𝑒𝑧) is the cumulative logistic distribution and the 
likelihood function of the logit is: 
𝑙𝑛𝐿 =  ∑ 𝑤𝑗  𝑙𝑛𝐹(𝑥𝑗𝑗∈𝑆 𝑏) + ∑ 𝑤𝑗  ln {1 − 𝐹(𝑥𝑗𝑏)}𝑗∉𝑆   
Where S is the set of all observations j, such that𝑦𝑗 ≠ 0, 𝐹(𝑧) =  𝑒
𝑧/(1 + 𝑒𝑧), and 𝑤𝑗 
denotes the optional weights. And the margins of the derivatives of the responses (marginal 
effects) are   
𝑑𝑦/𝑑(𝐶𝑆𝑅) =  𝛽1        
𝑑𝑦/𝑑(𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠) = 𝛽2       
For our analysis we only report the marginal effects results at their observed values.   
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IV. Results 
A. Identifying Myopia 
 
Equations 1a, 1b, 1c, 1d, and 1e are estimated using a system GMM. The results of this 
estimation are contained in Table V 
.All six models document significant persistence levels in the dependent variables. The 
Hansen-J test statistic indicates that the instruments are not correlated with the error terms, as we 
do not reject the null. Similarly first order serial correlation exists among the error terms 
(AR(1)), however no second order serial correlation (AR(2))  is present within our models, as we 
cannot reject the null of no second order serial correlation supports our model. 
Turning to model one, as expected ROA has the lowest level of persistence indicating 
that it is least dependent on past performance. Both Mktg and R&D, in models two and three, 
have estimates of persistence in excess of 0.6 indicating previous discretionary expenditures are 
very persistent through time, significantly higher than those reported by Mizik (2010). We 
believe the more efficient, unbiased and consistent estimators obtained by System GMM is 
contrasted here with the Anderson and Hsiao (1982) estimation used by Mizik (2010). Similarily 
Capex, in model four, has a high level of persistence, around 0.45. Models five and six indicate 
that strength and concern have even higher estimates of persistence, 0.82 and 0.71 respectively 
(all our estimates of persistence are significant at the one percent level). The results reflect the 
long-term nature of CSR activities. CSR activities tend to take several years to implement and 
require an ongoing commitment. For example, if a firm opens a crèche for its employees, the 
cost of staffing and running the crèche would represent an ongoing commitment for the firm, one 
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which would be difficult to undo. Unlike other discretionary activities CSR is often a series of 
undertakings to placate stakeholders, creating long-term counterparties who could take exception 
to changes in CSR commitments. 
After estimates of ?̂? and ?̂? are obtained for each series, the predicted dependent variables 
are computed for profitability(𝑅𝑂?̂?𝑖𝑡|𝑖𝑡−1,marketing intensity(𝑀𝑘𝑡?̂?𝑖𝑡|𝑖𝑡−1), Capex 
(𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑥̂ 𝑖𝑡|𝑖𝑡−1), R&D intensity (𝑅&?̂?𝑖𝑡|𝑖𝑡−1), and CSR profile (𝐶𝑆?̂?𝑖𝑡|𝑖𝑡−1). The error terms are 
computed for each firm and each year, and firms are assigned to a ‘myopic’ group and ‘non-
myopic’ benchmark groups on the basis of the sign of the resultant error term. Sample 
observations are classified as instances in which myopic management potentially takes place 
(i.e., (𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝑂?̂?𝑖𝑡|𝑖𝑡−1) > 0 and (𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑔𝑖𝑡−𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑔̂ 𝑖𝑡|𝑖𝑡−1) < 0, or (𝑅&𝐷𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅&?̂?𝑖𝑡|𝑖𝑡−1), < 0, 
or (𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 − 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑥̂ 𝑖𝑡|𝑖𝑡−1)<0,or  (𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝐶𝑆?̂?𝑖𝑡|𝑖𝑡−1)<0) 
B. Correlations 
Our initial analysis focuses on the correlation between our CSR measures and other 
discretionary corporate activities, usually associated with management myopia. Table V, Panel 
A, reports the pairwise correlations and significance values between Tobin’s Q, ROA, Mktg., 
R&D, Capex, Strength, Concern, Raw Ret., and CAR. The correlations provide the first 
indication of the relationship between performance indicators and the various discretionary 
expenditures firms might undertake. Tobin’s Q is significantly correlated with Mktg. (0.21), 
R&D (0.32), and Raw Returns (0.22), as expected. Alternatively, ROA shares a significantly 
negative correlation with R&D (-0.49) indicating that R&D intensity, at least in the short-term, 
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could be quite costly, but should provide long-term benefits. Turning to the discretionary 
expenditures Mktg., R&D and Capex are all significantly correlated with each other but the 
correlations are quite small. This would suggest that firms might evaluate and implement 
discretionary expenditures with regard to a basket of discretionary expenditures, although the 
interrelatedness is certainly small. Similarly the CSR measures share a significant and large 
correlation (0.25) between each other, suggesting firms might offset negative behavior with 
positive behavior. Strength is not significantly correlated with the other discretionary activities, 
except R&D, with which it shares an inverse relationship (-0.04). Strength activities do not seem 
to correlate with Mktg. and Capex. This is surprising as ex ante we would expect Mktg. and 
strength to correlate, as there is considerable synergy between the two activities. These results, in 
part oppose our initial hypothesis (𝐻1). Concern, on the other hand, does correlate with all three 
discretionary activities. Mktg. (-0.1) and R&D (-0.04) are both negatively and significantly 
correlated with concern behavior. The presence of socially destructive behavior seems to 
correlate with a management team who also underinvest in Mktg. and R&D, unlike, Concern and 
Capex, who share a positive significant correlation (0.04). We believe the correlation reflects the 
nature of capital expenditure activities in that big capital expenditure projects can be quite 
disruptive to local communities and the environment, as such these downstream impacts are 
reflected in the correlation.
5
 These results support our notion that strength and concern activities 
should not be considered ‘opposites’ or be ‘netted-off’. The simple correlations clearly indicate 
that strength activities do not share a significant correlation with other discretionary activities, 
                                                 
5
 Note that we standardize Mktg. R&D and Capex over Total Assets when reporting correlations, correlations 
between the raw discretionary expenditures and our CSR variables, yield significantly larger results. 
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with the exception being R&D where the relationship is negative. Alternatively concern behavior 
is significantly correlated with discretionary activities Mktg., R&D, and capex, supporting our 
initial hypothesis (𝐻1), however the relationships might not be as straightforward. Panel B, of 
Table V, presents the pairwise correlations between discretionary activities and the myopic 
indicators, discussed prior. Mktg. is naturally inversely, significantly, and materially correlated (-
0.472) with its own myopic indicator (Mktg_M.). The correlation would suggest, quite rightly, 
that firms with greater levels of Mktg. intensity are less associated with underinvestment in 
marketing. A small but significant correlation exists between Mktg. and strength myopia 
(Str_M.) indicating that firms with significant levels of marketing intensity are less associated 
with underinvestment in strength, as our a priori intuition would suggest (𝐻1) . Conversely 
marketing intensity is positively correlated with R&D myopia (R&D_M.) and Capex myopia 
(Capex_M.), 0.08 and 0.04 for R&D and Capex respectively. These rudimentary correlations 
could imply that firms who focus more on marketing, are less likely to optimal invest on other 
discretionary activities. The correlations indicate that discretionary activities might not be 
considered equal, or engaged similarly by management; management might focus on one 
discretionary activity at a time (management preference). Due to information asymmetry, 
management might act on private information to expand or focus on particular discretionary 
activities, where they believe the most gains can be captured. This would only be exacerbated by 
limited funds, as firms prioritize among the basket of discretionary activities. 
Conversely R&D intensity is negatively correlated with marketing myopia (Mktg_M.) but 
positively correlated with capex myopia (Capex_M.).We believe the results for R&D intensity 
28 
 
 
 
 
require greater discussion beyond the scope of this paper, as the rest of our work will show these 
symptomatic results for R&D seem to be consistent. We conjecture, based on these limited 
correlations, that R&D spending comes at the expense of capex funding (leading to potential 
myopia), but that R&D investment naturally leads to advancements in products, which ultimately 
require marketing  investment. Therefore R&D investment could be the upstream activity of a 
product launch, the downstream of which would be marketing. 
Capital expenditure (Capex) is positively and significantly correlated with all forms of 
myopia except Capex_M. and concern myopia (con_M.). The correlations confirm our previous 
assertions that firms might choose between different discretionary activities due to limited funds, 
the consequence of capex intensity might be myopic investment in other discretionary activities. 
Of note is the relationship between capex and concern myopia, the negative correlation would 
suggest that capital expenditure is negatively associated with concern myopia indicating that 
capex projects perhaps alleviate some of the concern behavior.
6
 For example, building a new 
factory that also reduces workplace injury and environmental impact would be associated with 
an increase in capex intensity and a reduction in concern. This intuition is supported when 
considering the correlation between Capex_M. and Con_M. here the correlation is significantly 
positive indicating again, that capex anemia is associated with myopic behavior with regard to 
concern reduction. Conversely, Capex_M. is negatively associated with all other forms of 
myopia. Similarly Mktg_M. is negatively associated with all other forms of myopia, except R&D 
which is negatively associated with capex myopia.  
                                                 
6
 This correlation contrasts the results between capex intensity and concern behavior found in Panel A, of Table V. 
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 Most intriguing, Con_M. is positively associated with all types of myopias, except 
strength myopia (Str_M). These initial correlations would indicate that concern behavior is 
associated positively with myopic behavior, as it is the only variable consistently positively 
associated with myopic behavior. Furthermore, other myopia are all generally negatively 
correlated with each other. This suggests that firms are unlikely to be myopic in more than one 
area at a time, supporting the notion that firms prioritize certain discretionary activities over 
others, with the exception of concern behavior. 
C. Myopia and Performance 
To assesses the magnitude of adjustment in the valuation of potentially myopic firms in future 
years. We determine the total value implications of myopia, including the financial market 
reaction in the initial period, when the myopic firms presumably realized the benefits of myopic 
management. We assess the difference in future multiyear cumulative risk-adjusted stock returns 
for firms with myopic CSR behavior versus benchmark firms when the initial period is taken into 
account. 
To evaluate the impact of myopia on firm performance we estimate the impact of firms 
who we classified as myopic in the same year that they report an earnings surprise. Error! 
Reference source not found., reports the results of estimating equation (2) using CAR, for firms 
with earnings surprises. The dependent variables are the Kth period ahead CAR, such that models 
one through five represent K=0,1,2,3, and 4 for CAR. Turning to model one, current year CAR 
(K=0), only strength myopia (Str_M.) and concern myopia (Con_M.) are significantly related to 
CAR, although differently. It would seem other forms of myopia do not have an immediate 
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association with CAR. CSR myopia on the other hand seems to be immediately recognized by 
the market; however the response is positive for strength myopia with an associated increase in 
CAR of 0.011, at one percent significance. The result, suggest that investors struggle to value or 
recognize strength myopia or perhaps see underinvestment in strength activities as appropriate 
cost-cutting behavior. These results support the notion that signaling behavior by myopic firms 
could distort the market equilibrium. At the extreme, good firms will be unable to credibly signal 
economic prospects, as Akerlof’s lemon’s market mechanism (1970) shows under these 
circumstances good firms will completely forgo an appropriate opportunity (Myers and Majluf 
1984). The positive results could reflect a distortion in the market, with regard to strength, and 
reduce the markets ability to recognize strength myopia.   Alternatively, strength activities might 
affect the risk profile of the firm, however unlikely, thereby impacting its abnormal returns (as 
we might be unable to account for the change in firm specific risk). Concern myopia (Con_M.) 
has a negative association with current CAR, 0.01 at five percent significance, indicating that 
investors immediately discount the increase in return associated with this myopia. Our results, 
once again underscore the importance of considering strength and concern activities separately, 
as concern behavior supports our second hypothesis (𝐻2) but the results for strength reject it. 
Surprisingly the market has difficulty recognizing Mktg., R&D, and Capex related myopia, as 
the coefficients are insignificant. These results imply that firms cutting strength spending are 
able to inflate their earnings sufficiently to circumvent any possible discounting of their earnings, 
unlike concern related myopia which will be captured by the market. These result confirm our 
earlier intuition that the persistence of CSR suggest that firms  should carefully consider changes 
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to their CSR profiles, as their decisions significantly impact the associated stakeholders, 
stakeholders with which the firm might have to co-exist for significant periods of time. As such 
it would follow that CSR myopic behavior might be more easily observed by market participants 
as the number of parties with intimate knowledge of the firm’s “normal” CSR level is not limited 
to management. Unlike other discretionary activities management’s ability to secretly manipulate 
its CSR profile to “generate” returns is reduced by stakeholders’ incentive to advocate against 
any changes that might negatively affect them, thereby informing the market. 
Models two through five reports the total value implications of myopia against CAR in 
the k =1, 2, 3, and 4th period ahead. With the exception of strength, myopic behavior is 
associated with later period negative adjustments in CAR. It would seem that the market 
discounts the returns of firms who behave myopically over several periods, as the market is able 
to comprehend the scale of occlusion, supporting our third hypothesis (𝐻3). The majority of the 
adjustment occurs in the 3
rd
 period ahead with return adjustment of -0.013, -0.022, and -0.033 for 
Con_M., Mktg_M., and Capex_M. respectively. Taking the results of model one into account it 
would seem that concern myopia is more immediately recognized than other types of myopia, 
however the adjustment might not be large enough, as there are further negative adjustments to 
firm’s CAR as the scale of the myopic impact is absorbed by the market. Interestingly R&D 
myopia does not significantly affect CAR even several periods in the future. This result 
continues to build on our previous results suggesting that R&D might be subject to different 
circumstances. We believe the intangible nature of R&D with its inconsistent downstream 
benefits might reduce the markets ability to recognize R&D myopia.  
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Models six though ten, present the estimation results for firms who engaged in myopic 
behavior, when reporting a negative earnings surprise. These results serve to contrast the 
market’s reaction to firms underinvesting in discretionary activities when negative earnings 
surprises occur as opposed to positive earnings surprises. Again models six through ten represent 
k=0,1,2,3,4 for CAR. Contrasting the CAR results between models one through five and models 
six through ten, we see that the market reacts favorably to firms reducing Mktg. investment when 
they experience lower than average earnings, not just immediately but over several periods. The 
results suggest that during periods of financial strain, firms are not penalized for reducing 
discretionary activities, particularly marketing. Similarly strength still shares an immediate 
positive response, while concern and capex myopia are still negatively associated with CAR over 
several periods. Overall our results would suggest that the market is least able to quantify 
changes in R&D intensity, as a result any earnings surprises driven by R&D myopia are not 
appropriately discounted. Furthermore, strength behavior either is not valued by the market (or 
firms in general over-invest in strength
7
) or the market has an inability to recognize strength 
myopia and the associated fictitious increase in returns. Most importantly our results provide 
evidence that the market instantly recognizes concern myopia in the face of potential earnings 
manipulation and continues to discount CAR for several periods after the fact.  When these 
results are considered in association with the correlations, it stands that concern is the best 
indicator of illicit managerial actions, and the market is best able to approximate these potential 
agency issues as it concerns concern. 
                                                 
7
 Perhaps due to lobbying and activist pressure. Thereby maintaining sub-optimally high levels of strength. 
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D. Likelihood of Myopia 
Our results up to this point indicate that the market is most sensitive to myopia as it concerns 
CSR, concern in particular. Again, CSR depends on forming, and importantly, funding 
relationships with employees, customers, suppliers, communities, governments, etc. These 
stakeholder counterparties, are naturally sensitive to changes in a firms CSR profile, as these 
changes affect them. As a consequence changes in CSR profile, specifically negative ones, 
would be met with resistance and advocacy from these counterparties. The actions of the 
stakeholders, in turn would increase information to the market, around the CSR profile of firms 
with respect to other forms of myopia. It should follow that a management team ethically 
inclined to reduce the firm’s negative impact on society, would potentially face a moral conflict 
with regard to any earnings manipulation. We believe that CSR could act as a myopic barometer 
potentially signaling myopic behavior.  
 We use equation three (3) to determine whether firms who engage in CSR are more or 
less likely to engage in myopic behavior when they experience an earnings surprise. Our results 
are reported in Table XX. We report the average marginal effects keeping all other variables at 
their observed levels, instead of the initial regression, to aid interpretation. Model one, regresses 
Mktg. myopia (Mktg_M.) against a set of control variables, Strength and Concern. Turning to the 
control variables we can see that larger (Size, -0.02) more profitable firms (ROA, -0.005) with an 
increase in sales (Sales-growth, -0.452) are less likely to engage in myopic behavior while firms 
under more financial stress (Leverage, 0.265) and substantial capital expenditure requirements 
(Capex, 1.027) are more likely to be myopic, with regard to Mktg. (all the marginal effects are 
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significant at the one percent level). The control variables perform as expected indicating firms 
better able to absorb financial stress and not faced with financial commitments are less likely to 
engage in Mktg. myopia, while reporting earnings surprises.  
 Next we look at the impact of strength on the likelihood of being myopic, in terms of 
Mktg., the marginal impact of Strength is miniscule, at 0.069, and the result is not significant. 
This result again, is surprising, like the correlations, considering the association between CSR 
and Mktg, especially strength. Tomayev &servaes indicates that the value associated with CSR, 
especially strength, lies in the firm’s ability to communicate (advertising) its CSR profile with 
end consumers. Our intuition would lead us to believe that strength should reduce the likelihood 
of Mktg. myopia, but our finding is not significant. Turning to concern, we see that concern 
behavior is significantly related to the likelihood of Mktg. myopia, at the 1 percent level. The 
result indicates that the marginal impact of concern is to increase the likelihood of myopia by 
37.9 percentage points of each discrete change in concern.  
 Model two, presents the results for R&D, again the control variables perform as expected. 
R&D seems to be the discretionary expenditure most sensitive to other discretionary activities, 
with the results suggesting firms would prioritize other spending before R&D, leading to 
myopia. These results help explain the correlations and market responses in our previous results.   
The presence of capital expenditure (Capex) has the largest impact on the likelihood of R&D 
myopia (1.821 at the one percent level), and marketing intensity is also positive and significant 
(0.14 at one percent significance). Strength behavior, rather confounding, is positively associated 
with the likelihood (0.661, at one percent significance) that firms might be R&D myopic. A 
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discrete increase in strength behavior marginally increases the likelihood of R&D myopia by 66 
percentage points of the discrete change in strength. Concern similarly increases the likelihood of 
R&D myopia (0.253 at five percent level). We believe that firms prioritize their funding, and in 
the presence of other funding commitments, with more tangible short-term benefits, firms would 
suspend R&D funding. Alternatively after a period of R&D a firm would commercialize its 
research efforts. In the case of a new product, firms would need to invest in property and plant to 
produce the product and marketing to take the product to market, during this period R&D 
expenditure might be scaled back to accommodate the increase in expenditure elsewhere. As 
such, our results might simply reflect the cycle of product development and innovation.  
However our results relate specifically to firms with positive earnings, indicating that cash 
constraints, might not necessarily be an issue, which likely means management might choose to 
cannibalize R&D over other discretionary expenditures to manipulate earnings. The value of 
R&D is not immediate to the firm’s current performance, as our previous results attest, and R&D 
progress is poorly observed by the market making it an ideal candidate for myopic behavior. 
 Model 3, presents the results of capex myopia (Capex_M.). Again the control variables 
perform as expected. Of note leverage is negatively associated with capex myopia (0.14, at one 
percent significance) indicating that firms with a reduced capacity to access debt financing are 
less likely to afford costly capex expansion. Surprisingly, Sales-growth increases the likelihood 
of capex myopia, although the marginal impact is incredibly small (0.095 at one percent 
significance). Perhaps periods of revenue growth forces management to prioritize the cash flow 
needs of growing sales and the associated purchase of inventory etc., over capital expenditure 
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projects.  The results of the R&D and Mktg. variables continue to support the notion that 
management will myopically engage one discretionary activity for the sake of performance, as 
both marginal effects are significant and positive (0.823 and 0.116 for R&D and Mktg. 
respectively at the one percent significance level). Strength is once again not significant. 
Concern behavior is again significant and positive. As with the previous models concern 
behavior increases the likelihood of firms behaving myopically with regard to capital 
expenditure (0.274, at the five percent level). It should be noted that the presence of concern 
within a firm, usually represents a lack of action and vision on the part of management to 
mitigate the negative impact the firm might have on its employees, environment, and 
community. Unlike other discretionary activities, an increase in concern is not expected to be 
related with an increase in cost to the firm (if anything a saving in expenditure). Our results 
would suggest that if firms are reluctant to expend the effort and absorb the costs associated with 
reducing their socially destructive behavior, then they are more likely to underinvest in other 
discretionary activities, especially if it allows them to manipulate their performance. The results 
for the other discretionary activities indicate that firms might prioritize funding between different 
activities, as such if a firm is already invested in Mktg. and R&D activities then thy might not 
prioritize capex funding, especially if it could impact performance. Concern on the other hand is 
consistently positively associated with the increase in likelihood of myopic behavior. 
Furthermore, increasing a firm’s concerns does not reduce a firm’s cash flows, therefore a 
reduction in funding for discretionary activities is more likely explained by dubious management 
prioritizing performance over investment in the long-term well-being of the firm. 
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 Comprehensively, we include the results of strength myopia and concern myopia as a 
function of other discretionary activities in models four and five. Strength myopia seems to 
increase when firms are more actively traded, suggesting that the market disciplines excessive 
expenditure on strength activities, as our previous results suggest. With the exception of capex’s 
very borderline significance, other discretionary activities are not significantly related to 
strength. Concern is significantly and negatively (-0.66, at one percent significance) associated 
with strength myopia. It is likely that firms will compensate for their socially destructive 
behavior by engaging in strength activities to remedy the negative externalities (we believe this 
course of action is often more cost effective then reducing the actual destructive behavior), as 
such firms with more concern activities will likely have more strength activities and be less 
likely to be myopic. Turning to our earlier correlations, we also saw a strong significant 
correlation between strength and concern, which is supported here. This result is reflected in 
model 5 where we see again that the presence of strength increases the likelihood of concern 
myopia (more concerns are associated with more strengths). Capital expenditure, which has been 
positively associated with other forms of myopia, is negatively associated with concern; along 
with R&D and Mktg. Our results suggest that firms with adequate levels of capital expenditure, 
R&D and Mktg., are less likely to be concern myopic. (-0.369 at one percent significance, -0.257 
at 5 percent significance, and -0.019 not significant, for Capex, R&D and Mktg. respectively) 
 The results from the logistic regression consistently present evidence that increased levels 
of concern is associated with an increased likelihood in all forms of myopia, and the presence of 
other discretionary activities reduce the likelihood of concern myopia. The result indicate that 
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firms with high levels of socially destructive behavior are more likely to manipulate earnings 
through myopic behavior. 
 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
Managers have a fiduciary duty to strategically align firm activities and partake in 
opportunities that maximizes shareholder wealth. Myopic management, in turn, involves altering 
operational practices that directly affect the business process to falsely signal an increase in 
performance. We show that the factors driving management myopia in capital expenditure, R&D 
and marketing, could affect management’s decisions relating to CSR, specifically concern. More 
importantly, our results indicate that CSR (specifically concern) can be considered a proxy for 
good management. Our results indicate that other forms of myopia do impact firms’ risk adjusted 
performance; however the market might struggle to immediately recognize management myopia 
in the face of increased earnings. We also show that CSR, specifically concern, is a good 
indicator of other forms of myopia and that the market has a better ability to recognize CSR 
myopia. Milgrom & Roberts (1992, p. 471) comment that, in general, managers “put too much 
emphasis on activities that boost short-term performance compared to those whose benefits will 
be hidden.” Our results confirms that the market struggles to quickly recognize traditional 
myopia, but that socially destructive behavior of firms, and the associated economic impact on 
the firms,  is recognized by the market. 
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Our results underscore the importance of considering socially responsible behavior and 
socially destructive behavior separately. We present evidence that the signaling behavior of 
myopic firms distort the market equilibrium to the point where good firms are unable to credibly 
signal economic prospects. As a result, the asymmetric information or information opacity 
around strength (Cho et al., 2013), coupled with the market’s heterogeneous capacity and desire 
to price the complexities of strength behavior, explain the confounding strength results. 
We supply evidence that strength and concern (CSR) behavior are incredibly persistent 
over time, reflecting the long-term nature of CSR activities. These result confirm our intuition 
that the persistence of CSR suggest that firms  should carefully consider changes to their CSR 
profiles, as their decisions significantly impact the associated stakeholders, stakeholders with 
which the firm might have to co-exist for significant periods of time. We believe CSR myopic 
behavior is more easily observed by market participants perhaps as the number of parties with 
intimate knowledge of the firm’s “normal” CSR level is not limited to management.  
Furthermore, our results consistently suggest that discretionary activities might not be 
considered equal, or engaged similarly by management; management might focus on one 
discretionary activity at a time. Due to information asymmetry, management might act on private 
information to expand or focus on particular discretionary activities, where they believe the most 
gains can be captured. In addition, firms are unlikely to be universally myopic across all 
discretionary areas, but more likely to neglect a particular area. Our findings indicate that R&D 
myopia is not immediately or subsequently recognized by the market, making it an ideal 
candidate for myopic behavior. 
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 The results from the logistic regression consistently present evidence that increased levels 
of concern is associated with an increased likelihood in all forms of myopia, and the presence of 
other discretionary activities reduce the likelihood of concern myopia. This indicates that firms 
with high levels of socially destructive behavior are more likely to manipulate earnings through 
myopic behavior. However firms with high levels of strength behavior are not less likely to be 
myopic, and in some cases might be more likely. 
 Our results shed light on the complex interplay between discretionary activities and the 
multifaceted impact of CSR on firm’s corporate activities. Ultimately our results indicate that 
socially responsible behavior is a poor indicator of good management and is unrelated to myopic 
behavior with regard to other discretionary expenditures. However, a firm’s level of socially 
destructive behavior is significantly correlated with management quality and the likelihood that a 
firm might engage in myopic practices for the sake of earnings manipulation. 
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A. Figures 
 
Figure 1. Net-CSR distribution. The graph shows the histogram plot of Net-CSR. 
 
Figure 2. Strength Distribution. The graph shows the histogram plot of Strength. 
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Figure 3. Concern Distribution. The graph shows the histogram plot of Concern. 
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B. Tables 
 
 
Table I 
 Sample Size by Year 
Table I shows the number of firms included in the study assessed by KLD for each calendar year from 1991 
through to 2009. 
Year Number of Firms 
1991 546 
1992 556 
1993 548 
1994 546 
1995 554 
1996 561 
1997 563 
1998 565 
1999 573 
2000 561 
2001 991 
2002 1002 
2003 2728 
2004 2802 
2005 2783 
2006 2732 
2007 2702 
2008 2597 
2009 2655 
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Table II 
KLD’s ESG Descriptive Statistics 
Table II. Presents the descriptive statistics of the Net-CSR, Strength and Concern scores for each of KLD’s ESG 
categories as well as the overall score. The scores presented are transformed from binary points used by KLD and 
instead represent a percentage of possible points obtained. The statistics are calculated on the pooled sample, 
spanning calendar years 1991 through 2009. 
      
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Pooled 
Net-CSR 26565 -0.02 0.06 -0.40 0.34 
Strength 26565 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.49 
Concern 26565 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.51 
Community 
Net 26565 0.01 0.11 -0.61 1.00 
Strength 26565 0.03 0.09 0.00 1.00 
Concern 26565 0.02 0.07 0.00 0.75 
Corporate Governance 
Net 26565 -0.05 0.17 -1.00 0.75 
Strength 26565 0.04 0.09 0.00 0.75 
Concern 26565 0.08 0.14 0.00 1.00 
Diversity 
Net 26565 -0.04 0.22 -0.67 0.88 
Strength 26565 0.07 0.12 0.00 0.88 
Concern 26565 0.11 0.16 0.00 0.67 
Employment 
Net 26565 -0.03 0.16 -0.80 0.83 
Strength 26565 0.05 0.11 0.00 0.83 
Concern 26565 0.08 0.12 0.00 0.80 
Environmental 
Net 26565 -0.01 0.10 -0.83 0.60 
Strength 26565 0.02 0.07 0.00 0.80 
Concern 26565 0.03 0.10 0.00 1.00 
Humanity 
Net 24915 -0.01 0.07 -0.75 1.00 
Strength 24915 0.00 0.04 0.00 1.00 
Concern 26565 0.02 0.08 0.00 1.00 
Product 
Net 26565 -0.03 0.15 -1.00 0.75 
Strength 26565 0.02 0.07 0.00 0.75 
Concern 26565 0.05 0.13 0.00 1.00 
  
Table III 
Financial Descriptive Statistics 
Table III reports the descriptive statistics for the pooled sample spanning calendar years 1991 through 2009. (‘000) indicate 
figures presented in thousands. EBIT is earnings before interest and tax, Ln(Mcap)  is the natural logarithm  of market 
capitalization, ln(Turnover) is the natural logarithm  of volume to shares outstanding. 
      
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Adjusted Price 26565 $28.66 $58.06 $1 $3561 
Adjusted Shares ('000) 26565 204,401 588,845 372 22,900,000 
Average Monthly Volume ('000) 26565 1,317,066 5,372,910 189 484,000,000 
Market Capitalization ('000) 26565 $5,925,838 $19,900,000 $5,831 $602,000,000 
Raw return 24501 0.05 0.50 -4.77 3.26 
CAR 24501 -0.11 0.24 -12.97 0.05 
      Ln(Total Assets) 26166 7.43 1.72 3.89 12.14 
ln(Turnover) 26565 1.65 1.09 -4.43 7.74 
Tobin’s Q 26163 2.00 1.80 0.34 56.98 
Book to Market 25503 0.55 0.44 0.04 2.76 
Total Liabilities to Total Assets 26101 0.57 0.28 0.00 7.71 
      EBIT to Assets 26152 0.07 0.17 -12.48 1.95 
EBIT to Equity 26145 0.20 5.66 -568 324 
      R&D to Sales 26057 0.09 0.39 0 3.32 
Advertising to Sales 8694 0.03 0.07 0.00 3.32 
Sales growth 25713 0.49 2.64 -0.99 21.53 
Marketing Intensity 21063 0.21 0.21 -0.37 2.62 
R&D Intensity 26166 0.03 0.08 0 1.17 
CAPEX intensity 26166 0.04 0.06 0 0.74 
  
Table IV 
Shift in CSR Scores Over Time 
Table IV reports the yearly average CSR score of Net-CSR, Strength and Concern for calendar years 1991 through 2009. Panel A reports the 
yearly average CSR score of Net-CSR, Strength and Concern for calendar years 1991 through 2000, as well as the average for that decade. 
Panel B reports the yearly average CSR score of Net-CSR, Strength and Concern for calendar years 2001 through 2009, as well as the average 
for that nine year period. 
Year Net Strength Concern 
Panel A:1991 through 2000 
    1991 0.01 0.04 0.03 
1992 0.01 0.05 0.04 
1993 0.00 0.06 0.06 
1994 -0.01 0.05 0.06 
1995 0.00 0.06 0.06 
1996 0.01 0.06 0.04 
1997 0.00 0.06 0.06 
1998 0.00 0.06 0.06 
1999 0.00 0.06 0.07 
2000 -0.01 0.06 0.07 
Average 0.00 0.06 0.06 
Panel B: 2001 through 2009 
2001 -0.01 0.04 0.05 
2002 -0.02 0.04 0.06 
2003 -0.02 0.02 0.04 
2004 -0.03 0.03 0.06 
2005 -0.03 0.02 0.05 
2006 -0.03 0.03 0.06 
2007 -0.03 0.03 0.06 
2008 -0.03 0.03 0.06 
2009 -0.03 0.03 0.06 
Average -0.03 0.03 0.06 
 
 
 
 
  
Table V 
Identifying Myopia 
Table reports the system GMM estimates of persistence,𝜙, for each dependent variable using their lagged values, from calendar year 1991 
through 2009. We control for year fixed effects, industry fixed effects, and specify errors robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelaiton. The 
dependent variable for model one through six is ROA, Mktg, R&D, Capex, Strength, and Concern. We also incorporate the following control 
variables Size (logarithm of total assets), Leverage (total liabilities to total assets), Sales-growth (sales in time t with respect to sales in t-1 over 
sales in t-1), Mktg. (selling, general, and administrative expenses less R&D expenses to total assets), R&D (R&D expenses to total assets), Capex 
(capital expenditure to total assets), Strength, and Concern. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 ROA Mktg. R&D Capex Strength Concern 
ϕ 0.231*** 0.685*** 0.662*** 0.446*** 0.823*** 0.713*** 
 (0.026) (0.027) (0.042) (0.030) (0.012) (0.012) 
Size 1.160
***
 -0.012
***
 -0.001
*
 -0.002
***
 0.005
***
 0.006
***
 
 (0.262) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Leverage -26.035
***
 0.042
***
 -0.011
*
 -0.007
*
 -0.001 0.002 
 (3.373) (0.013) (0.006) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) 
ROA  -0.001
***
 -0.001
***
 -0.000 0.000 -0.000
***
 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Mktg. -9.254
***
  0.009 0.016
**
 0.007
*
 -0.001 
 (3.106)  (0.012) (0.007) (0.004) (0.005) 
R&D -98.551
***
 -0.084  0.028 0.020
***
 0.028
***
 
 (8.762) (0.074)  (0.018) (0.006) (0.010) 
Capex -1.318 0.105
***
 0.048
***
  0.016
***
 0.010 
 (4.847) (0.038) (0.012)  (0.005) (0.009) 
Strength 3.947 0.132
***
 0.041
***
 0.015  -0.001 
 (4.746) (0.032) (0.014) (0.014)  (0.014) 
Concern -8.717
***
 0.003 0.008 0.017
*
 -0.004  
 (3.327) (0.023) (0.009) (0.010) (0.008)  
Sales_growth 4.384
***
 -0.062
***
 -0.010
***
 0.015
***
 -0.001 0.001 
 (0.835) (0.009) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) 
Intercept 12.274
***
 0.117
***
 0.023
***
 0.024
***
 -0.029
***
 -0.026
***
 
 (2.006) (0.014) (0.007) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) 
N 16809 16691 16810 16810 16810 16810 
Hansen J Test 1345 1297 1324 1355 1400 1342 
p 0.967 0.997 0.988 0.951 0.786 0.972 
AR1  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR2 0.462 0.088 0.090 0.020 0.226 0.016 
Chi^2 1208 14318 9197 5841 13202 6846 
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust S.E Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
  
 
Table VI 
Correlations 
Table V Panel A reports the pairwise correlation matrix between Tobin’s Q, ROA, Mktg, R&D, Capex, Strength, Concern, Raw Ret., and CAR for calendar years 1991 through 2009. 
Tobin’s Q is calculated as market value of assets over book value of assets, where market value is equal to total assets plus market equity less book equity. Return on assets (ROA) 
is calculated as earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) to total assets. Marketing intensity (Mktg.) is selling general and administrative expenses less research and development 
expenses over total assets. Research and development intensity (R&D) is R&D expenditure over total assets. Capital expenditure intensity (Capex) is capital expenditure  over total 
assets. Raw Ret. is 𝑅𝑎𝑤𝑖𝑡 = 𝑙𝑜𝑔 ∑ = [1 + (𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑤 − 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒,𝑤)
52
𝑤=1 . To estimate the risk adjusted stock returns we employ The Fama and French (1993, 1996) three-factor plus 
momentum (Carhart, 1997) model to compute compounded abnormal yearly returns from weekly returns. Specifically compounded abnormal stock return (CAR) is:𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 =
𝑙𝑜𝑔 ∑ = [1 + (𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑤 − 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑤)
52
𝑤=1  where 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑤 = ?̂?𝑖𝑡(𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡,𝑤 − 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒,𝑤) + ?̂?𝑖𝑡(𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑤) + ℎ̂𝑖𝑡(𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑤) + ?̂?𝑖𝑡(𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑚) and ?̂?, ?̂?, ℎ̂, and ?̂? come from estimating 
The Fama and French (1992, 1993) three factor model augmented with momentum (Carhart, 1997) factor, for each firm i, in year t: 
(𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑤 − 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒,𝑤) = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑖𝑡(𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡,𝑤 − 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒,𝑤) + 𝑠𝑖𝑡(𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑤) + ℎ𝑖𝑡(𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑤) + 𝑚𝑖𝑡(𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑚) +  𝜀𝑖,𝑤. Panel B reports the pairwise correlation matrix between 
Mktg., R&D, Capex, Mktg_ M., R&D_M., Capex_M., Str_M., and Con_M. for calendar years 1991 through 2009. With Mktg_M. being a categorical variable taking the value of 1 
if (𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑔𝑖𝑡 − 𝑀𝑘𝑡?̂?𝑖𝑡|𝑖𝑡−1) < 0, otherwise 0. R&D_M. being a categorical variable taking the value of 1 if (𝑅&𝐷𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅&?̂?𝑖𝑡|𝑖𝑡−1) < 0, otherwise 0.Capex_M. being a categorical 
variable taking the value of 1 if (𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 − 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑥̂ 𝑖𝑡|𝑖𝑡−1) < 0, otherwise 0. Str_M. being a categorical variable taking the value of 1 if  (𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 − 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ̂ 𝑖𝑡|𝑖𝑡−1) < 0, 
otherwise 0. Con_M. being a categorical variable taking the value of 1 if where (𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑡 − 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑛̂ 𝑖𝑡|𝑖𝑡−1) > 0, otherwise 0 . 
 Panel A: Returns Correlation Matrix 
 Tobin's Q ROA Mktg. R&D Capex Strength Concern Raw Ret. CAR 
Tobin's Q 1         
ROA 0.019
***
 1        
Mktg. 0.214
***
 0.059
***
 1       
R&D 0.323
***
 -0.488
***
 0.069
***
 1      
Capex 0.075
***
 0.079
***
 0.052
***
 -0.053
***
 1     
Strength 0.023
***
 0.094
***
 0.003 -0.035
***
 0.006 1    
Concern -0.042
***
 0.027
***
 -0.097
***
 -0.042
***
 0.044
***
 0.249
***
 1   
Raw Ret. 0.218
***
 0.173
***
 0.019
***
 -0.038
***
 -0.052
***
 -0.005 -0.032
***
 1  
CAR -0.013
**
 0.302
***
 -0.033
***
 -0.148
***
 -0.016
**
 0.069
***
 -0.007 0.160
***
 1 
 Panel B: Myopia Correlation Matrix A 
 Mktg. R&D Capex Mktg_ M. R&D_M. Capex M. Strength M. Concern M.  
Mktg. 1         
R&D 0.069
***
 1        
Capex 0.052
***
 -0.053
***
 1       
Mktg._M. -0.472
***
 -0.074
***
 0.028
***
 1      
R&D_M. 0.083
***
 -0.351
***
 0.069
***
 0.164
***
 1     
Capex_M. 0.036
***
 0.107
***
 -0.461
***
 -0.062
***
 -0.068
***
 1    
Str_M. -0.025
***
 -0.005 0.020
**
 -0.036
***
 -0.074
***
 -0.040
***
 1   
Con_M. 0.010 -0.004 -0.018
**
 0.008 0.040
***
 0.035
***
 -0.044
***
 1  
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Table VII 
Myopia and Performance 
Error! Reference source not found.table reports the regression coefficients for the relationship between CAR and myopia from calendar year 1991 through 2009. We control for 
year fixed effects, industry fixed effects, and cluster standard errors at the firm level. The dependent variables are the Kth period ahead CAR, such that models one through five 
represent K=0,1,2,3, and 4 for firms with performance surprises and models six through ten represent K=0,1,2,3, and 4 for firms with performance disappointments. *, **, *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. We also incorporate the following control variables Size (logarithm of total assets), Leverage (total liabilities to 
total assets), Sales-growth (sales in time t with respect to sales in t-1 over sales in t-1), M/B (market value of equity to book value of equity), Advertising (advertising expense to 
sales), R&D (R&D expenses to sales), Capex (capital expenditure to total assets), Strength, and Concern. Control variables are not reported for parsimony. 
 Performance Surprise Performance Disappointment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 K=0 K=1 K=2 K=3 K=4 K=0 K=1 K=2 K=3 K=4 
Str_M. 0.011
***
 0.018
***
 0.005 -0.005 -0.004 0.018
***
 0.016
***
 0.001 0.010 0.003 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) 
Con_M. -0.010
**
 -0.000 -0.000 -0.013
**
 -0.023
**
 -0.003 -0.013
***
 -0.019
**
 -0.019
**
 -0.016
*
 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.010) (0.003) (0.005) (0.007) (0.009) (0.008) 
Mktg._M. -0.003 -0.004 -0.022
***
 -0.036
***
 -0.037
***
 0.013
***
 0.012
**
 0.014
**
 0.018
**
 0.013 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.009) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.010) 
R&D_M. -0.002 -0.001 0.004 0.006 -0.001 0.003 -0.004 -0.008 -0.013 0.004 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.011) (0.004) (0.005) (0.008) (0.010) (0.009) 
Capex_M. -0.000 -0.010
*
 -0.034
***
 -0.033
***
 0.005 -0.005 -0.010
*
 -0.026
***
 -0.010 0.018
*
 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.014) (0.004) (0.006) (0.008) (0.011) (0.010) 
N 8034 6594 5259 4258 3380 8008 6530 5467 4354 3413 
adj. R
2
 0.260 0.230 0.149 0.136 0.115 0.440 0.263 0.130 0.085 0.085 
F 55.52 50.63 34.25 32.54 21.76 49.264 43.605 15.836 15.994 18.653 
p 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Ind. Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effects Yes No No No No Yes No No No No 
Firm Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table VIII 
Likelihood of Myopia 
Table represents the marginal estimates of the logistic model that captures the impact of CSR on the likelihood of a firm being myopic. 
Specifically:Pr(𝑀𝑦𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡 = 1) =  𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽1′𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2′𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜓𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖,𝑡 where 𝑀𝑦𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡 is defined as a categorical variable that 
takes the value of 1 if firm i in year t was categorized as potentially myopic and 0 if otherwise. ′𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is either Strength, and Concern 
′𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 is a vector of control variables including Size (logarithm of total assets), Leverage (total liabilities to total assets), Sales-growth (sales 
in time t with respect to sales in t-1 over sales in t-1), Mktg.(selling, general, and administrative expenses less R&D expenses to total assets), 
R&D (R&D expenses to total assets), Capex (capital expenditure to total assets). Furthermore 𝐹(𝑧) = 𝑒𝑧/(1 + 𝑒𝑧) is the cumulative logistic 
distribution and the likelihood function of the logit is:𝑙𝑛𝐿 =  ∑ 𝑤𝑗  𝑙𝑛𝐹(𝑥𝑗𝑗∈𝑆 𝑏) + ∑ 𝑤𝑗  ln {1 − 𝐹(𝑥𝑗𝑏)}𝑗∉𝑆  where S is the set of all observations j, 
such that𝑦𝑗 ≠ 0, 𝐹(𝑧) =  𝑒
𝑧/(1 + 𝑒𝑧), and 𝑤𝑗 denotes the optional weights. And the margins of the derivatives of the responses (marginal 
effects) are  𝑑𝑦/𝑑(𝐶𝑆𝑅) =  𝛽1 and 𝑑𝑦/𝑑(𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠) = 𝛽2. For our analysis we only report the marginal effects results at their observed values. 
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Mktg_M R&D_M Capex_M Str_M. Con_M. 
Size -0.022
***
 -0.034
***
 -0.058
***
 0.076
***
 -0.019
***
 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) 
Turnover 0.036
***
 -0.052
***
 -0.008 0.059
***
 0.011 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Leverage 0.299
***
 0.297
***
 -0.148
***
 -0.017 -0.118
***
 
 (0.053) (0.073) (0.040) (0.031) (0.038) 
Sales_growth -0.462
***
 -0.573
***
 0.046 -0.007 -0.017 
 (0.037) (0.042) (0.034) (0.030) (0.029) 
ROA -0.010
***
 -0.006
***
 -0.010
***
 -0.008
***
 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Mktg.  0.458
***
 0.065 0.036 -0.032 
  (0.054) (0.045) (0.047) (0.043) 
R&D -0.383
**
  0.541
***
 -0.270
*
 -0.316
*
 
 (0.186)  (0.195) (0.147) (0.173) 
Capex 0.945
***
 1.839
***
  0.357
**
 -0.540
***
 
 (0.179) (0.193)  (0.147) (0.149) 
Strength 0.178 0.679
***
 0.049  0.168 
 (0.205) (0.202) (0.181)  (0.188) 
Concern 0.419
***
 0.374
**
 0.536
***
 -0.640
***
  
 (0.159) (0.150) (0.149) (0.148)  
N 8445 8500 8500 8500 8500 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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